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Creating and maintaining semantic structures such as ontologies continues
to be an important issue. The approach investigated here is to let members of an
online community create structured knowledge collaboratively and to use ratings
to evaluate the data created. Obviously, such ratings have to be of high quality.
Honest rating mechanisms (HRMs) known from literature are a promising means
to gain such high-quality ratings. However, the design of such mechanisms for
collaborative knowledge creation and their effectiveness have not been studied
so far. To evaluate the effects of an HRM on rating quality in this context, we
have conducted several experiments with online communities. We find that an
HRM increases rating quality and “punishes” rating errors. We also find that
rating-based rewards increase the quality of the structured knowledge created.
1 Introduction
Structured knowledge, e.g., in the form of ontologies, has become increasingly
important. The question of how to create it on a larger scale, however, continues
to be a fundamental research issue. The approach investigated in this paper is
web-based peer production [5]. It is a decentralized production process where
contributors work on a project without a hierarchical organization. It is both
scalable when adding further users and robust because individual users can be
replaced.
When a community of peers, without a coordinating authority, creates and
maintains structured knowledge, two questions arise: 1) How to motivate users?
Many online communities suffer from under-contribution [4], i.e., only a minor-
ity contributes. 2) How to ensure and assess data quality? Compared to, say,
Wikipedia, quality assurance may be even more important for structured knowl-
edge, which is used for query processing or automated reasoning.
In this paper, we study how rating-based incentive mechanisms can assure
the quality of the structured knowledge created collaboratively. We envision
the following real-world scenario: A community creates structured knowledge
collaboratively. Its members review the contributions of each other and rate
them according to the quality perceived. For instance, think of a project with
partners who are geographically distributed, and who all contribute to a common
knowledge base. To motivate users to contribute, they receive rewards according
to the number and quality of their contributions. The quality of contributions, in
turn, is computed based on the ratings. Finally, the points gathered are converted
into external rewards, e.g., gift coupons as with Epinions or system privileges as
with Slashdot. Ratings have to be of high quality as well. A promising approach
to gain high-quality ratings are honest rating mechanisms (HRMs) [13, 14, 16].
An HRM rewards subjective truthfulness in scenarios where no objective truth
criterion is available. To the best of our knowledge, these mechanisms have not
been studied yet in the context of collaborative knowledge creation.
In this paper, we study the following research questions regarding the creation
of structured knowledge.
1. How do reward mechanisms for contributions as well as for ratings influence
user behavior?
2. Does an HRM lead to ratings of higher quality, compared to a fixed reward
per rating?
3. How do rewards for contributions dependent on ratings influence the quality
and the number of contributions, compared to rewards that are fixed?
To this end, we have developed a platform for the collaborative creation of
structured knowledge called Consensus Builder (CB). It features fine-grained
rating and incentive mechanisms, in particular an HRM, and is operational in a
real-world environment1. Based on the research questions, we formulate a num-
ber of hypotheses and test them in a series of controlled field experiments. The
setups are close to the real-world scenario envisioned. Controlled experiments al-
low us to gain insights into causal effects of the tested mechanisms. This cannot
be achieved by observational studies. For each experiment, we have recruited a
different community. Participants have used CB from home or from their work-
place to create structured data.
We make the following contributions:
– We describe the features of Consensus Builder, our platform for the collabo-
rative construction of structured knowledge. It contains reward mechanisms
for contributions and for honest ratings.
– We discuss how reward mechanisms can be applied to the creation of struc-
tured knowledge.
– Based on our research questions, we formulate hypotheses and design exper-
iments to test them.
– We extensively test the reward mechanism w.r.t. the creation of structured
knowledge in different settings and with participants of different backgrounds.
A main finding of ours is that an HRM leads to ratings of equal or higher qual-
ity, compared to static rewards. Further, we find that rating-dependent rewards
for contributions do improve contribution quality, but result in fewer contribu-
tions compared to a fixed reward per contribution.
Paper outline: Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 presents our collabo-
ration platform. We discuss the HRM in Sect. 4. Section 5 states our hypotheses.
Section 6 discusses the experimental setup and sections 7 and 8 present the re-
sults of the experiments. Section 9 concludes.
1 See http://consensus.ipd.uka.de/techrep for a demo.
2 Related Work
Various tools for the collaborative creation of structured knowledge have been
proposed, ranging from full-fledged ontology editors with collaborative features
[18, 19] over Wiki-based approaches for semantic data [3] to tools that support
tagging folksonomies [12, 20]. There also exist commercial tools for the collabo-
rative creation of structured knowledge, notably Freebase2. Some of these tools
feature rating mechanisms. However, we are not aware of any systematic at-
tempts to evaluate the effect of ratings on knowledge quality for these tools.
[11] studies rating based incentive mechanisms for the collaborative construc-
tion of structured knowledge. The authors conduct two controlled experiments
and find that ratings are a reliable measure of contribution quality. Further, they
find that the presence of ratings increases the quality of contributions compared
to a setting without. However, they do not test the effect of incentive mechanisms
for ratings on rating quality and user behavior.
Eckert et al. use feedback from users of Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)
to construct is-a relations between terms in a philosophy knowledge domain [8].
They compare the results to expert opinions and conclude that experts perform
better. Since the AMT workers must understand the knowledge domain at hand,
this approach is only applicable to domains that are commonly known, but not
to domains that require specific knowledge.
Von Ahn uses games to motivate users to perform useful tasks [1]. For exam-
ple, users in the ESP game are randomly paired to create tags for an image and
receive points whenever their tags match. Siorpaes and Hepp [17] use this prin-
ciple to build ontologies from Wikipedia entries by categorizing entries as either
classes or instances. Users receive points when they agree on the categorization.
Again, these approaches are better suited for knowledge domains that are com-
monly known and where data is already available, e.g., in form of Wikipedia
entries. They cannot be used when the structured knowledge is created from
scratch. Next, the game of assigning Wikipedia entries to predefined categories
and rewarding users based on answers by other users is essentially an HRM
scenario. Thus, an HRM could give way to better results with these games.
3 Creating Structured Knowledge with Consensus
Builder
This section describes our tool Consensus Builder (CB) that allows for the col-
laborative creation of structured knowledge.
Data format. CB uses a data format similar to Topic Maps [15] and Entity-
Relationship Models with some slight deviations for better usability. Data can
be created on the type and on the instance level. I.e., users can specify the
schema and create instance data. Topics represent entities of the real world, e.g.,
2 http://www.freebase.com
Fig. 1: Details for topic ‘Harrison Ford’ in Consensus Builder
Harrison Ford or Indiana Jones. Topics can have one or more types, e.g.,
Harrison Ford is of type Person and of type Actor. Types contain attributes
and association types. Attributes describe simple data, like ‘date of birth’, and
are constrained by data types, e.g., integer, string. Association types describe
associations between topic types, e.g., Actor <acts in> Movie.
Collaborative Editing and Rating. Users can create and change all parts of the
data model collaboratively. They can create single data elements like attributes
or topics and change elements created by others. When a type is added to a
topic, it inherits the attributes and association types of that type. Users can
then set attribute values and add associations. CB takes care that users can
create only attribute values and associations that are valid regarding the type
level. In addition, CB provides various functions for browsing and searching,
comments to discuss topics and topic types, and statistics such as user scores.
CB features a fine-grained association between ratings and contributions,
called rating scheme, that lets users assess the quality of contributions on a very
detailed level. Users can rate every element on the type as well as on the instance
level that can be manipulated, e.g., topic names, attributes and association types,
and attribute values.
Since our rating scheme is very fine-grained, we use a binary rating scale, i.e.,
ratings are either ‘low’ or ‘high’, in order not to overload the user. Cosley et al.
show that, even though users prefer a finer-grained rating scale, the granularity
of the rating scale does not have an adverse effect on user behavior [6]. The
functions for rating, editing, and displaying of the data are tightly integrated in
the user interface (cf. Fig. 1).
Users can change and delete individual contributions. However, change oper-
ations are not trivial in any setting where data items depend on each other. For
instance, what happens with other contributions and ratings associated with a
contribution just deleted? Think of the deletion of a type that has associated
topics and has received high ratings. To address these issues, we have made the
following design decision. A contribution can only be changed if it satisfies two
conditions. First, it must not be associated with other contributions, e.g., an
attribute can only be changed if there are no attribute values associated with it.
Second, it either must not have received any ratings, or its average rating value
must be below a certain threshold. Consequently, only contributions deemed low
quality can be changed. The user who has changed the contribution becomes its
new owner.
Commission: Rating-Based Remuneration. To motivate users to create and main-
tain the data we reward data operations with points based on ratings by other
users. We refer to the rating-based remunerations as commission. A user obtains
a commission every time another user issues a positive rating for a contribu-
tion that first user is the owner of. The value of the commission is computed
as κ · c(operation), where κ is a constant factor depending on the scenario, and
c(operation) depends on the operation. For instance, c(create topic) = 3.0, and
c(set attribute value) = 2.0.
Other Data Formats. The objective of this paper is the design and deployment of
incentive mechanisms for the collaborative construction of structured knowledge.
In this specific context, the data format to encode the knowledge is of secondary
concern. We have mainly chosen the data format described above because of its
ease of use for non-expert users. The functionality of CB is applicable to other
formats for structured knowledge as well, such as those specific to the Semantic
Web. Furthermore, the data format currently used can be mapped to OWL in
a straightforward way: Topic types are mapped to OWL classes, attributes to
data-type properties, association types to object properties (as well as to their
inverse properties) with domains and ranges restricted to the respective classes
or data types, topics are mapped to instances, attribute values to literals, etc.
4 Honest Rating Mechanism
We want to elicit high-quality ratings, as opposed to ratings that are uninformed
or simply copy the majority opinion. (This does not exclude the majority opinion
from being correct.) However, a simple reward, e.g., one point per rating, does
not suffice. It does not provide an incentive for the rater to gather information
before issuing her rating and to respond truthfully.
To address these challenges, we use an incentive mechanism that rewards
truthful ratings [13]. The mechanism has been designed for online product ratings
where buyers perceive a noisy signal about the quality of a product and rate it
according to their perception. The mechanism collects ratings from the buyers
and computes a score for each rating. The quality of the product is fixed and
defines the type of the product. The mechanism assumes a finite number of types
indexed by t = 1, . . . , T . Let Si denote the noisy signal perceived by rater i about
the quality of the product, and let S = {s1, . . . , sM} be the set of possible signals.
Conditional on the product’s type, the signals of the raters are independent and
identically distributed. Let Pr(sm|t) = Pr(Si = sm|t) be the probability that a
buyer receives signal sm when the true type of the product is t. The mechanism
assumes Pr(.|.) to be common knowledge, and
∑M
j=1 Pr(sj |t) = 1.
After all buyers have received the signals, the mechanism asks them to submit
ratings according to their signals simultaneously. Let ri = (ri(1), . . . , ri(M))
denote the rating strategy of rater i. That is, i announces ri(j) whenever she
observes signal sj . The honest reporting strategy is r̄ with r̄(j) = sj for all j ∈
{1, . . . ,M}, i.e., the rater always reports the truth. Subsequently, the mechanism
scores every rating submitted by comparing it to the rating of another rater,
ref(i), called the reference rater of i. Let τ(ri(j), rref(i)(k)) be the payment
received by i when she announces ri(j) and ref(i) announces rref(i)(k).
The expected payment of rater i depends on her prior belief and on the
signal sj she has received:




Pr(Sref(i) = sk|Si = sj)(τ(si(j), sref(i)(k)))
The conditional distribution that ref(i) receives the signal sk can be computed
as Pr(sk|sj) =
∑T
t=1 Pr(sk|t) · Pr(t|sj). The posterior probability Pr(t|sj) of
type t given the perception of signal sj , can be computed using Bayes’ Law.
The honest reporting strategy r̄ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all
signals sj ∈ S and all reporting strategies r̂ 6= r̄:
V (r̄, r̄|sj) ≥ V (r̂, r̄|sj) (1)
Miller et al. prove that payment schemes τ(., .) for V (., .|.) which satisfy (1) exist.
We use a linear program described in [13] to compute the payments.
The mechanism uses i’s rating to update the probability distribution that
predicts ref(i)’s rating. The score reflects the quality of the reference rating
relative to the updated distribution. If the rating of the reference rater is honest,
a rater can maximize her expected payment by announcing her subjective beliefs.
In the following we describe the design decisions behind our implementation
of the HRM: We have modelled signals to be in the set {l, h} and types to be
in the set {1, . . . , 9}. For each rateable contribution we maintain estimates of
two probability distributions: the prior distribution of the types Pr(t) and the
signal distribution Pr(sj |t). We have modeled types and signal distributions with
type i generating a distribution Pr(h|i) = i/10 as proposed in [14], e.g., type 3
generates h ratings with frequency 0.3. For each contribution we maintain one
type distribution Pr(t). We also maintain a global type distribution that we use
to initialize Pr(t) of newly created items. We update Pr(t) with the new ratings
submitted. If someone changes an item, we reset its rating history and initialize
its prior distribution with the global distribution at the time of change.
We put subsequent ratings of a contribution into groups of small size (typ-
ically 3 or 4) and score ratings in a group against each other. To motivate the
user further, we display the sum of the expected scores for her unscored ratings.
5 Hypotheses
We formulate three hypotheses. They refer to the quality of either ratings or
contributions. We measure quality with respect to a gold standard. I.e., a high
quality rating coincides with the gold standard, whereas a low quality rating or
rating error does not.
Hrate: An HRM improves rating quality.
Hcomm: Commissions improve contribution quality and reduce quantity, com-
pared to fixed remunerations.
In the case of static rewards users are rewarded for every contribution, re-
gardless of its quality. This is why we expect contributions to be fewer, but of
higher value when they are rewarded contingent on ratings of other users.
Herr: Rating errors receive lower scores from the HRM.
6 Experiments
To test our hypotheses we have conducted three experiments with CB. In each
experiment, we randomly assigned participants to the experimental group (EG)
or the control group (CG). We use the EG to evaluate the effects of the mech-
anisms in questions. The CG serves as the baseline. In the following, we first
present the individual experiments. We then describe characteristics of the ex-
perimental setup common to all experiments, the different gold standards we use
for quality assessment, and the statistical methods we use in our analysis.
Rateonly. In this experiment we focus exclusively on the HRM. We recruited
participants among students of our chair and instructed them to rate 127 con-
tributions. We had preselected these 127 contributions from a knowledge base
which students had created for the domain “Karlsruhe Institute of Technology”
in a creation phase prior to the experiment itself. The selected contributions re-
mained embedded in the other contributions from the creation phase. But since
we wanted to test the rating mechanism in isolation for this experiment, we dis-
abled ratings for these other contributions, as well as data manipulations. This
reduces effects not related to the HRM. For three days, participants rated the
contributions using CB. To test Hrate, we scored participants in the EG with the
HRM, while the CG was scored statically with one point per rating.
Honstudents. We tested Hrate in a setting with the full functionality of CB. We
invited students of the lecture “Machine Design” of the department of mechanical
engineering. We told them to create topics and types which represent the content
of the lecture and to rate the contributions of others. Again, we rewarded the
EG by means of the HRM and the CG with one point per rating. To allow for
comparing ratings of CG and EG later on, both groups had to rate contributions
from the same set. For this reason, participants of both groups worked together
on the same data. If the groups had used separate data, it would have been hard
to say whether differences in rating quality result from the rating mechanism or
from differences in the nature of the contributions.
Honstaff. We repeated the experiment Honstudents to test Hrate in a set-
ting close to that of a community within a company. For this run we invited
researchers from the Institute of Product Engineering. As knowledge domain we
used a model for the engineering design process developed by this institute [2].
We advised participants to use the elements of that engineering model as topic
types and concrete instances as topics.
Commission. We designed the next experiment to test Hcomm. Testing it in
the experiments just described would have been difficult. This is because testing
Hcomm requires the CG and the EG to operate on separate data in order to elim-
inate potential influences between the groups and to allow for an unambiguous
quality assessment of the contributions of each group. Such undesired influences
are likely to occur in shared knowledge bases because data entries depend on
each other, e.g., the contributions on the instance level depend on the schema
level. Furthermore, according to Hcomm, we expect a higher number of low qual-
ity contributions in the CG. This might affect the results even more if both
groups operated on shared data. Commission took place in a real world setting
as well. Participants were students of the lecture “Database Systems”. Again, we
asked participants to model the content of the lecture and related information
on the schema and instance level and to rate contributions of each other. To
test Hcomm, we choose usage of commissions as independent variable: The CG
received a fixed amount per operation depending on the operation category, as
specified by c(operation). To prevent potential exploitation, this amount was
deducted when the contribution was deleted. The EG received commissions con-
tingent on the operation category and on ratings of other participants, i.e., the
current owner received κ · c(operation) for every positive rating the contribution
had received and 0 points for negative ratings. We set κ to 0.2. We rewarded
ratings of both the CG and the EG by means of the HRM.
In each experiment described so far, at least one of the experimental groups
used the HRM. This allows us to test Herr.
Experimental Setups – Discussion. Our experiments go well beyond vanilla lab-
oratory experiments, in several respects: They take place in real-world settings,
within online communities where participants are not restricted by laboratory
conditions. Unlike toy domains, the knowledge domains used were complex and
had real-world significance. The participants used CB from home or from their
workplace. We put attention to not letting them know that an experiment was
taking place nor that there were different experimental groups, by announcing
the experiments as “beta test and user study”. (We introduced experimental fea-
tures by means of announcements within CB.) Further, the assignment to groups
was transparent to the participants, i.e., there were no indicators (e.g., specific
URLs, etc.) that made the group explicit. The experiments lasted up to several
weeks. This has blurred the distinction between real world and experiment fur-
ther. Finally, participants remained anonymous to each other throughout the
experiment and had no information about how many members their respective
communities had. In this respect, the settings do not differ from large online
communities.
Further Characteristics of the Experiments. To allow for a comparison with the
CG, which was rewarded 1 point per rating in the experiments that test Hrate,
we scaled the expected score of the HRM to 1.5 points. (Assuming risk-averse
participants, we use 1.5 points instead of 1.) To stimulate participation, we
announced a fixed monetary compensation for all users who reached a certain
number of points. In addition, we conducted a lottery at the end of each experi-
ment. The number of lottery tickets depended on the points achieved during the
experiment. Lottery prices varied over the experiments and included monetary
payments as well as prices like usb sticks. For Rateonly, we paid a fixed mone-
tary compensation to the CG and a point-dependent amount to the EG. Prior to
each experiment, participants could take part in a “training phase” to get accus-
tomed with CB. The purpose of the training was to remove potential distortions
of the experiments due to the learning curve. Next, participants could enter an
experiment while it was already running. The domain of the email address con-
strained the registration to guard against sybil attacks, i.e., against single users
creating multiple accounts to gain unfair advantages [7]. An algorithm based on
biased coin randomization [9] assigned participants to either the CG or the EG,
while keeping the numbers of members of the groups balanced.
After each experiment, we invited the participants to complete a question-
naire. It elicited feedback on rewards, ratings, rating mechanisms, the behavior
of other participants, and the usability of CB. The number of questions per
questionnaire ranged up to 24, dependent on the configuration for the respective
participant. We used a five point Likert scale response format (‘strongly disagree’
to ‘strongly agree’) for most questions.
Gold Standards for Quality Assessment. Assessing the quality of contributions
and ratings required several different gold standards. For Honstudents, Hon-
staff, and Commission we let domain experts rate a subset of contributions
and used their ratings as gold standard. The subset depended on the hypothesis
to test. Testing Hrate required comparing the rating quality between the CG
and the EG. We randomly picked 150 contributions that had received at least
one rating from both experimental groups. To test Hcomm we simply picked 50
contributions randomly from each group. The experts used the same CB user
interface as the participants to issue ratings. To understand the context, experts
could see all contributions created in the respective experiment. For Commis-
sion, in addition to the detail ratings for randomly selected contributions such
as attributes, associations etc., we let the experts assess the ‘overall quality’ and
‘overall adequateness’ of the topic or topic type associated with the respective
contribution as a whole. This allows for a comprehensive quality assessment of
the contributions. For the overall ratings we used a five-star rating scale in-
stead of a binary one. We chose the following domain experts for the various
experiments: the teaching assistant of the respective course for Commission
and for Honstudents, and a scientist whose research topic is the engineering
model that served as the domain for Honstaff. Since both domain experts had
limited experience in data modeling for the latter two experiments, a database
expert supported them with the data modeling.
For Rateonly we selected 127 contributions manually, out of the more than
5000 contributions created during the data-creation phase. The contributions
selected were unambiguously correct, as confirmed by information publicly avail-
able on websites. We manipulated 34 out of the 127 contributions (all on instance
level) so that they were false. The manipulated contributions together with the
remaining manually selected ones served as the gold standard.
We classified the manipulations in three categories according to the effort
needed to verify the respective errors:
1. Easy to verify. These are blatant errors, like a building having 666 elevators
or a paper on sensor networks published in 1920.
2. Medium effort to verify. This category contained plausible-looking errors,
like changes in room numbers or changes in co-authors of a paper. They
could be detected by internet search.
3. Hard to verify. These manipulations were subtle and could only be verified
with high effort, for example, the number of floors in a remote building.
We expect that the HRM has an effect on errors of Category 2 only. Both
groups should recognize errors in Category 1. Category 1 allows checking whether
participants made any effort at all. For Category 3, the effort for error detection
exceeds the benefit from honest ratings by much. It serves as an extra check to
exclude the possibility that the EG was more motivated than the CG a priori.
Table 1 shows an overview of the different setups.
Statistical Methods. We use Pearson’s χ2 test to evaluate associations between
binary variables, e.g., between classification errors and usage of the HRM. (For
directional associations we use the one-tailed χ2 test [10].) We use Student’s
t-test to compare the means of the five-star ratings for overall quality. We use
Pearson’s correlation to test the point-biserial correlation between binary rating
errors and rating scores. Finally, we use Spearman’s ρ to test the correlation
between Likert responses from the questionnaire and experiment results.
Rateonly Honstudents Honstaff Commission
Static Ratings CG CG CG -
Honest Ratings EG EG EG both
Static Contrib. - - - CG
Commission all all all EG
Duration 3 days 3 weeks 2 weeks 3 weeks
Shared Data CG/EG yes yes yes no
Gold Standard Manipulation Experts Experts Experts
Table 1: Overview of Experimental Setups
7 Results
We present the results of our experiments, including the evaluation of the hy-
potheses and of the questionnaire. Table 2 shows a list of quantitative charac-
teristics of the four experiments.
Rateonly Honstudents Honstaff Commission
CG EG CG EG CG EG CG EG
Participants 3 6 8 12 10 10 11 14
Contributions 127* 127* 151 1052 136 162 802 206
Ratings 381* 762* 943 456 419 555 180 151
Ratings per Contribution 3* 6* 0.78 0.38 1.4 1.86 0.22 0.73
Table 2: Overview of the Experiments (*Number of contributions and ratings
fixed.)
7.1 Hrate: An HRM improves rating quality.
The absolute rating error for a rating rij ∈ {0, 1} of participant j for contribu-
tion i and gold standard gi ∈ {0, 1} is |rij − gi|. We average over all ratings for
which we have a gold standard to calculate the mean absolute error (MAE).
For Honstudents there was a highly significant association between rating
errors and the usage of the HRM (χ2(1) = 71.52, p < 0.01). The MAE was much
higher for the CG (0.57) than for the EG (0.11). The odds ratio of making a
rating error when using the HRM was 0.09. We conclude for this experiment
that the mechanism improved rating quality.
For Honstaff we found no statistically significant association between rat-
ing errors and the usage of the HRM (χ2(1) = 1.9071, p = 0.17). The CG
showed slightly better results regarding rating quality (MAE=0.16) than the
EG (MAE=0.22). For Honstaff we conclude that there is no significant effect
of the HRM on rating quality. A possible reason for this is that the researchers
already had a high intrinsic motivation to create high-quality data since they
wanted to use it in their research later on. This high intrinsic motivation might


















Fig. 2: Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
by Error Category
Table 3: Pearson correlation
between absolute error and score
for ratings scored with the HRM
Experiment Correlation p
Honstudents -0.18 0.38
Honstaff -0.26 < 0.01
Commission -0.97 < 0.01
Rateonly -0.83 < 0.05
Figure 2 shows the MAE for the three error categories of Rateonly for
CG and EG respectively. The participants of the EG made significantly fewer
errors in the “medium effort to verify” category (odds ratio = 0.5, χ2(1) = 3.3,
one-tailed p < 0.05). For the other two error categories we found no significant
association between errors and the usage of the HRM. The MAE for ratings of
non-manipulated contributions was very low in both groups (CG: 0.054, EG:
0.043) and the association not statistically significant (two-tailed χ2(1) = 0.27,
p = 0.6). We conclude that, for this experiment, the HRM increases rating
quality.
Summing up, we find that two out of three experiments support Hrate.
7.2 Hcomm: Commissions improve contribution quality and reduce
quantity.
To test the “quality” part of Hcomm we compare the five-star expert ratings for
selected contributions rewarded with commission (EG) to those rewarded stat-
ically (CG). The quality ratings for the contributions rewarded statically were
significantly lower (mean = 0.76, se = 0.03) than for contributions rewarded
with commissions (mean = 0.88, se = 0.03 t(85.7) = −2.6311, p < 0.01). The
ratings for adequateness of contributions rewarded statically were significantly
lower as well (mean = 0.77, se = 0.04), compared to those rewarded with com-
missions (mean = 0.98, se = 0.02, t(70.4) = −5.3688, p < 0.01).
There were much fewer contributions per participant in the group using com-
missions (mean = 27.0, se = 7.96) than in the one without (mean = 126.5, se =
67.27). However, the difference was not statistically significant (t(5.14) = 1.47,
p = 0.10). Interestingly we also found that participants remunerated with com-
missions seem to rate more critically. The ratio of negative ratings was signifi-
cantly higher in the EG (0.258) than in the CG (0.039) (χ2(1)=31.2, p < 0.01),
even though the experts rated the contributions of the EG more favorably.
7.3 Herr: Rating errors receive lower scores from the HRM.
To test Herr we calculate the correlation between the absolute rating error and
the rating score by the HRM. A negative correlation means that the HRM scored
rating errors lower than correct ratings. For Rateonly we calculate the corre-
lation per user, since every participant issued the same number of ratings. For
the other experiments we calculate the correlation coefficients per rating.
Indirectly, Herr measures the average agreement of the raters with the gold
standard. If the community, more precisely, the raters using the HRM, is suffi-
ciently in agreement with the gold standard, punishment in the form of lower
scores should follow. If, on the other hand, the community disagrees with the
gold standard on average, rating errors should yield higher scores. Such a dis-
agreement could happen for reasons of systematical differences in perception,
e.g., due to different tastes or incompetence, or because of collusion attacks.
We find rather strong negative correlations for Commission and for Ra-
teonly, and weak ones for Honstudents and for Honstaff (cf. Table 3).
Potential reasons for the two strong correlations could be that the manipula-
tions used as gold standard in Rateonly are more precise than expert ratings.
For Commission, we speculate that the strong correlation results from the bet-
ter knowledge of participants regarding data-modeling techniques, and therefore
a higher correlation with the expert ratings, compared to participants of Hon-
students and Honstaff.
Overall, we conclude that the HRM punished rating errors to different de-
grees. The communities seem to have been in consensus with the experts, i.e.,
there were no systematic differences in perception.
7.4 Evaluation of the Questionnaire
27 out of the 46 users invited answered the questionnaire. Figure 3 shows the
results for selected questions. We asked participants which rating strategy they
used to maximize their rating score. Some stated an altruistic attitude “I did
not intend to get as many points as possible, but tried to increase the quality
of contributions by rating pointless or bad contributions as bad.”, “I tried to
rate as much as possible as honestly as possible.” (both rewarded by the HRM).
Others said they tried to maximize their scores, although with different rating
strategies, dependent on their respective scoring mechanism, namely “Rating
many items. But only those whose quality was easy to decide.” (HRM), and
“Simply rated everything, no matter how.” (static reward for ratings).
Finally, we analyzed the correlations of experimental results of the par-
ticipants and their questionnaire answers. Not surprisingly, we find a positive
correlation between the understanding of the HRM and the number of ratings
Number of responses
Better contributions due to commission
Better contributions due to ratings
Convinced, honest ratings maximize score
Creating data with Consensus Builder was easy
Granularity of the rating scale(Exactly right(1), Too coarse(2)))
Granularity rating scheme (Too fine(1), Right(2), Too coarse(3))
Honest rating mechanism easy to understand
Honest rating mechanism induced effort
Others rated honestly
Others were (Cooperative(1)−Competetive(5))
Rated according to the group opinion
Rated honestly
Ratings improve data quality
Rewards (lottery and compensation) were adequate
Tried to vote down others







Fig. 3: Number of Responses for Selected Questionnaire Questions. Answers
range from 1: ‘strongly disagree’ to 5: ‘strongly agree’, unless noted otherwise.
(ρ = 0.52, p < .05). There is a strong correlation between the number of ratings
and the stated strategy of rating the contributions of others badly in order to
keep their scores low, but only for raters whose ratings were scored statically
(ρ = 0.764, p < 0.5), while for participants using the HRM this correlation was
negligible (ρ = 0.16, p = 0.59). We find a weak correlation between the under-
standing of the HRM and the score received per rating (ρ = 0.31, p = .18). In
other words, it is not necessary to understand the mechanism in order to profit
from it.
8 Discussion and Lessons Learned
Participants have been intrinsically motivated to some degree. They made good
contributions and gave high-quality ratings even when they did not receive an
extra reward for it. This is pronounced for the close-knit group of staff members.
However, one of our results is that contributions and ratings are at least as
good or better in the presence of commissions and the HRM, respectively. We
speculate that, at least to some degree, the intrinsic motivation resulted from the
fixed monetary compensation for participation, insofar as participants felt they
had to offer at least some effort. In fact, when planning the experiments, given a
fixed total budget, we were confronted with a tradeoff between two quantities: on
the one hand, the guaranteed compensation, on the other, the score-dependent
compensation. A low guaranteed compensation results in fewer participants. A
high guaranteed compensation provides less incentive from rating dependent
rewards.
Despite the rewards offered, ratings are sparse in both CG and EG in the
experiments with a variable number of ratings, i.e., there are not nearly as many
ratings per contribution as there are participants per group (cf. Table 2). Ques-
tionnaire responses offer some explanation for this: Some participants do not like
to rate data items they do not understand well enough even if they receive a
guaranteed score. One participant of Rateonly dropped out after the creation
phase because she did not feel sufficiently familiar with the knowledge domain.
Another reason might be the guaranteed compensation, as discussed above.
The results show a weak correlation between rating scores and understanding
of the mechanism. An interesting question is whether a fake HRM would have
the same effects as the real one. The authors of the HRM claim, but do not test,
that it is not necessary for users to understand the HRM [14]. Instead it suffices
if users trust the mechanism and believe that truthful answers maximize their
scores in the long run. We speculate that telling participants that an HRM is
used while scoring with some fake mechanism (for example, randomly) would
still yield comparable results, at least in the short run. This could be tested
experimentally by comparing the alternatives ‘no mechanism’, ‘real HRM’, and
‘fake HRM’. Note that, even if a fake mechanism yielded results similar to those
of the real mechanism, the real mechanism would still be at least as good (or
better in case participants realized the fake).
Next, it turned out to be difficult to find domains with all of the follow-
ing characteristics: (a) They are sufficiently controversial to generate variance
in the ratings. (b) The experimenters, but not the participants, have access to
the gold standard. For example, in the creation phase before the Rateonly
experiment, participants kept the schema extremely simple and almost exclu-
sively copied data publicly available on the web. Since the contributions were
almost completely correct, there were no negative ratings and hence no variance
in the rating values. This means that we could not have measured the effects of
our mechanisms on either contribution or rating quality of the creation phase
meaningfully.
Finally, the quality of the schema created by participants not familiar with
data modeling was surprisingly good. Despite some beginner mistakes (confusion
of normal associations and type associations, creation of topic type ‘Properties’)
the quality of the schema level was good and detailed.
9 Summary
In this paper we have investigated how rating-based reward mechanisms can
improve the quality of structured knowledge created collaboratively. In particu-
lar, we have discussed how mechanisms for honest ratings known from literature
can be applied to this scenario. We have presented a community platform that
features such reward mechanisms. We have formulated hypotheses and designed
experiments to evaluate the effects of reward mechanisms for the collaborative
creation of structured knowledge. We have carried out the experiments with
different online communities. The communities constructed complex knowledge
domains in settings close to real-world scenarios. We find that an honest rating
mechanism improves the quality of ratings in two out of three experiments and
that it “punishes” rating errors with lower scores. Further we find that rewards
for good contributions increase the quality of the contributions.
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